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Divine Needs, Divine Illusions:
Preliminary Remarks Toward a




A surprising number of Western studies or translations of the Sufi thinker
and mystic Ibn Al’Arabi (1165–1240) make some kind of reference to the
German preacher Meister Eckhart (1260–1327). The strength and convic-
tion behind such references vary—while some simply mention Eckhart in
passing, others (such as R. W. Austin) speak of “striking resemblances,”
while Richard Netton, in his 1989 work Allah Transcendent, goes so far as to
call Ibn ‘Arabi “the Meister Eckhart of the Islamic Tradition.”1
There is certainly something exotic in bringing together two figures
such as Eckhart and Ibn Al’Arabi; ecumenical agendas rightly find some-
thing reassuring in locating similarities between such diverse spiritual vo-
cabularies as those of a Dominican preacher and a Sufi saint. However, the
perfectly laudable desire to discern common elements among disparities is
no justification in itself; however forcefully certain resemblances might strike
us, it still remains to be seen whether such resemblances escape the super-
ficial and point the way toward a deeper core of common thought.
Even without having read a word of either thinker’s works, it is not
difficult to see why so many scholars seem to link them together. These
scholars both attempt a radical synthesis of the mystical with the philosoph-
ical; further, they subsequently suffer persecution from the authorities as
a result. They both embark upon lengthy pilgrimages or journeys, lasting
years (Seville to Damascus, Erfurt to Avignon); they even draw their own
set of disciples after them (Suso, Tauler, Davud Al’Qayseri, al-Qushani) to
commentate upon their works and disseminate their ideas. Even the mod-
ern critical debates concerning the two are analogous—arguments over
1. Fusus al-Hikem [“The Bezels of Wisdom”], trans. Ralph Austin (New Jersey:
Paulist Press, 1980), p. 16. The Arabic edition used is A. E. Affifi’s edition (Beirut:
Dar al-kutub al-’Arabi, 1946). All page numbers to original are in bold. Ian Richard
Netton, Allah Transcendent: Studies in the Structure and Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy,
Theology and Cosmology (Routledge, 1989) p. 293.
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both thinkers’ orthodoxy and their denominational status (Shi’ia or Sunni?
Catholic or early precedent of the Reformation?), the same allegations of
pantheism, the same questioning of their clarity and coherence as thinkers
(Denifle/Affifi), the same comparisons with Far Eastern thought-systems
(Suzuki, Ueda/Izutsu)—such superficially appealing similarities, although
valid enough to invite comparisons, are still not enough to ground them.
Therefore, the aim of this article is to briefly consider five possible areas
in both thinkers’ work where “striking resemblances” might lead to some
genuinely similar foundations.
I. ONENESS AND MULTIPLICITY: EINHEIT AND TAWHID
As Neoplatonism plays a central role in the vocabulary of both thinkers—
Eckhart as reader of Proclus and Dionysius, Ibn Al’Arabi as reader of
Plotinus (via the famous Theology of Aristotle, actually the last five sections
of the Enneads)—it is not surprising to find the oneness of God as a domi-
nant motif in both thinkers’ work. The main point to be made here is that,
although both Eckhart and Ibn Al’Arabi present an all-encompassing One-
ness which is the source of all multiplicity in the cosmos, Eckhart’s version of
this overflowing Oneness is more Neoplatonic and less Aristotelian than that
of Ibn Al’Arabi.
“Do not let manyness veil you from the tawhid [unity] of Allah!” writes
Ibn Al’Arabi in the Futuhat.2 Indeed, the immanence of God is displayed in
His effects—effects that, however various, “spring[s] in reality from a single
substance, its primordial substance.”3 Whoever would seek gnosis must learn
“to see the details in the whole” and also as “part of the whole.”4 Thus, for Ibn
Al’Arabi, multiplicity or kathra, correctly perceived, can ultimately lead one
back to the source—which is where Eckhart’s idea of the One’s relationship
to the multiple seems to differ. Although Eckhart naturally concedes that
“God is One” (Deus unus est), and is happy to acknowledge how “all things
and the fullness of being are in the One by virtue of its indistinction and
unity,”5 the possibility of returning to the One via the multiple never really
emerges as a central idea in his work. There are certainly moments in the
vernacular sermons where it occurs (“grasp God in all things, for God is in
all things”), but they are outshadowed by a generally negative impression
of the multiple, one which offers little promise of a breakthrough into the
2. William G. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989),
p. 155 (taken from the Futuhat al-Makkiyah II.619.11).
3. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 153.
4. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 47, p. 48.
5. Oliver Davies, ed., Meister Eckhart: Selected Writings (London: Penguin, 1984),
p. 259.
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God beyond God.6 “Unity unites all multiplicity, but multiplicity does not
unite unity.”7 Eckhartian multiplicity is the consequence of a fall, a descent
from harmonious, ineffable purity into the fragmentary, impure confusion
of this world; often used as a synonym for nothingness or creatureliness, such
multiplicity has to be escaped, renounced, and purged before the soul can
return to the One.
Ibn Al’Arabi, on the other hand, sees multiplicity as an extension of the
One, even a development, as opposed to a fragmentary consequence of a
divine overflow. The phenomenal world is no residual glimmer of a distant,
once radiant source, but rather a constantly recurring possibility to obtain
knowledge of the One through the many:
He commanded [His servants] only to seek knowledge of God by
considering the engendered things which are temporally created. Each
engendered thing gives them the knowledge of the divine relationship
from which it became manifest.8
Hence the radically different attitudes toward the world in the works of
Ibn Al’Arabi and Meister Eckhart. Whereas Eckhart dismisses any spiritual
attention spent upon fallen multiplicity as a regressive move in the wrong
direction (“Go out of this world and depart from all this toward which your
soul still feels an inclination”9), Ibn Al’Arabi considers such an idea to be
founded on ignorance ( jahil):
His ignorance makes him imagine that the cosmos is far removed
from God and that God is far removed from the cosmos. Hence he
seeks to flee (farar) to God.10
Ultimately, it is Eckhart’s disbelief in the ability of the believer to reach God
through His secondary causes—to glimpse, so to speak, the One’s inward
dimension (batin) through its outward (zahir)—that distinguishes the two
thinkers’ relationship toward oneness and multiplicity.
Why does such a distinction make Ibn Al’Arabi more Aristotelian? To
understand this, one has first to grasp how the world of phenomena in
6. Reiner Schu¨rmann, Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1978), p. 183: “nim got in allen dingen! wan got ist in allen dingen. . . .” All German
quotations will be taken from Niklaus Largier’s two-volume edition of Josef Quint’s
selection, Meister Eckhart: Werke (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), Predigt, p. 30; Largier,
p. 342.
7. James M.Clark, Meister Eckhart (London: Nelson & Sons, 1958), p. 219:
“einicheit einet alle manicvalticheit, aber manicvalticheit eneinet niht einicheit”
(Predigt, p. 11; Largier, p. 134).
8. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 156; Futuhat II.671.5.
9. Schu¨rmann, Meister Eckhart, p. 51.
10. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 158.
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the Great Sheikh’s system is a constant, selective actualizing of the Divine
Mind, which in Itself contains an infinite quantity of possible, nonexistent ima-
ges (‘ayna thabita), awaiting to be translated into corporeal reality. For Ibn
Al’Arabi, creation is literally a constant marrying of the possible with the
actual. In depicting this, Ibn Al’Arabi follows the Aristotelian privileging of
actuality over possibility by introducing mercy (rahman) into his concept of
creation. In an act of gratuitous kindness (imtinan), God relieves the possible
things from the misery of nonexistence by bringing them into reality—by be-
stowing upon them, as Ibn Al’Arabi says, “the sweet pleasure of existence.”11
It is difficult to find an equivalent of this in Eckhart, for whom crea-
turely multiplicity seems to be a diffusion of the purity of the One, and who
seems to prefer the nameless to the named, the unexpressed to the actual-
ized. Whereas in Ibn Al’Arabi the possible, nonexistent things clamor to be
brought into existence, in Eckhart “they all clamor to return to that place
from which they had emerged. Their whole life and being is a clamoring
and a hastening back to Him from whom they were born.”12 Ibn Al’Arabi,
so to speak, emphasizes the outflowing (exitus), whereas Eckhart is more
interested in the return (redditus), a return to the One not via the many,
but rather through an emptying of the soul and an annihilation of the self.
Differing attitudes toward multiplicity which, ultimately, belong to different
cosmologies.
II. GOD AS CONSTRUCT AND THE GOD BEYOND GOD:
AL-HAQQ AND THE GOTHEIT
A more compelling similarity can be found in the way both thinkers recog-
nize a distinction between the God they believe in and a more primordial,
radically unknowable source of divinity—in effect, a ‘God’ they can talk
about and a ‘God’ they can not. However, once again the differences lie not
so much in the common idea of ‘God’ as a construct, but rather in the two
thinkers’ attitudes toward this situation.
For Eckhart, the God we worship is certainly a God of truth, love, jus-
tice, and the like, a God we can pray to, imagine, and invoke. However, what
Eckhart calls the Godhead (gotheit) is the silent, divine darkness prior to and
beyond ‘God’, a nameless abyss bereft of characteristics which the soul must
breakthrough to (durchbruch) if it is to experience true spiritual union with
the One—hence Eckhart’s cry: “I beg God to rid me of ‘God’.” As long as
11. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 87.
12. Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 130: “Die haˆnt alle ein ruofen, wider in ze
komenne, daˆ sie uˆzgevlozzen sint. Allez ir leben und ir wesen daz ist allez ein ruofen
und ein ıˆlen wider ze dem, von dem zie uˆzgegangen sint” (Predigt, p. 53; Largier,
p. 568).
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we continue to think of God in terms of names, concepts, characteristics,
images, we cannot truly experience the nameless, imageless ineffability of
the Godhead—which is why Eckhart so often exhorts us to abandon meta-
physical constructs in our search for a true spiritual encounter with the
divine: “That we should forsake God is altogether what God intends, for as
long as the soul has God, knows God and is aware of God, she is far from
God.”13 Not only does Eckhart see God as a construct, but also as something
which ob structs, the Wittgensteinian ladder which, once we have climbed,
we have to kick away from under us.
With Ibn Al’Arabi, although the initial idea remains the same, its evolu-
tion takes a slightly different course. In the final lines of the Fusus Al-Hikam,
we read:
The God of beliefs is subject to certain limitations, and it is this God
who is contained in his servant’s heart, since the Absolute God cannot
be contained by anything, being the very Essence of everything and of
Itself.14
The phrase “Gods of belief” is often employed by Ibn Al’Arabi. Earlier on
in the Fusus we see it used:
When a person rationally considers God, he creates what he believes
in himself through his consideration. Hence he worships only a God
which he has created through his consideration.15
Our finite minds construct finite concepts (tasawwur) for God, concepts
that spring from our limited, single perspectives of the all-encompassing
One. However, whereas Eckhart sees this as a purely metaphysical affair—we
instinctively give names like Good and Love to God—Ibn Al’Arabi discusses
this on a much more personal level, suggesting that every individual creates
his or her own individual God:
The great variety of beliefs is hidden from no-one. He who delimits
Him denies Him in other that His own delimitation, while acknowl-
edging Him only when He discloses Himself in that whereby he has
delimited Him.16
Believers are ignorant insofar as they remain unaware, in the certainty of
their utter self-conviction, of any other versions of God other than the God
they worship (and here Ibn Al-Arabi is referring to, amongst others, the
Ash’arites and the Mu’tazilites). They mistake their perspective for the bird’s
13. Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 244.
14. Fusus al-Hikem p. 284, p. 226.
15. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 339.
16. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 339.
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eye view, their singular interpretations for the final exegesis. This proposal
that every believer’s God is ultimately a God of his own making does have a
skeptical flavor to it, and leads Ibn Al’Arabi to some radically apophatic state-
ments which, if taken out of their context, could strike one as trenchantly
pessimistic:
Hence you will see no-one who worships an unmade God, since man
creates in himself that which he worhips and judges.
When a person sees something of the Real, he never sees anything
but himself.17
However, it is precisely the difference between Eckhart and Ibn Al’Arabi on
this point which saves such remarks from pessimism. Eckhart sees any kind
of conceptualization of God as an injustice (unreht) upon His ineffability,
and urges the believer to abandon ‘God’ as quickly as possible. Names such
as Goodness and Truth clutter the Eckhartian soul, ideal state of which is
an emptiness and openness (ledeger offenung) toward the Godhead. Images
impede, names obstruct, concepts spiritually get in the way.
In contrast, Ibn Al’Arabi takes a far more benign view of the “Gods
of belief,” seeing them (perhaps more resignedly) as an inevitable conse-
quence of our finitude. One sees here the greater degree of Godliness that
Ibn Al’Arabi is willing to concede to the everyday world of phenomena;
“correct behavior” does not consist in completely abandoning one’s own
beliefs as irrevocably false and idolatrous, but simply acknowledging their
limitations and allowing for the possibility of other versions of God without
denouncing them in favor of our own. Once the believer learns to do this,
he or she can begin to see God not only in his own beliefs but in all other
manifestations:
He who is more perfect than the perfect is he who believes every belief
concerning Him. He recognizes Him in faith, in proofs, and in heresy
(ilhad), since ilhad is to deviate from one belief to another specific belief.
In other words, Ibn Al’Arabi is not asking God to rid him of ‘God’, but
simply to rid him of his blinkers—the dogmatic convictions which prevent
the believer from acknowledging the omnipresence of the One in everything
around him. A gesture which, it should be noted, does not constitute a
theological free-for-all, as Ibn Al’Arabi’s own remarks on idolatry (shirk) bear
out. Even the idolater, he says, worships God, albeit unknowingly. Because
the Real (al-haqq) manifests itself in all things, even one who worships a
stone or a tree worships God, the sin lies merely in one’s obliviousness of
the fact. It is difficult to imagine such a notion occurring to Eckhart.
17. Chittick, Sufi Path, pp. 351, 341.
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III. THE DIVINITY OF THE SELF, THE DEPENDENCY OF
GOD: THE VUNKLEIN AND THE SECRET OF THE SOUL
The greatest obstacle to writing with any degree of clarity about the divinity
of the self in Eckhart and Ibn Al’Arabi lies precisely in the critical debates
that have risen in the wake of the two thinkers, debates that highlight the
ambiguity of both authors’ remarks on the relationship between God and
the soul. Thus, Nazis such as Alfred Rosenberg and Marxist critics such as
Ernst Bloch (not to mention the Papal commission of 1327) perceived an
Eckhartian soul that has the capacity to become God in every sense of the
word, while critics such as James M. Clark consider such conclusions to be
nothing but a willful misunderstanding of the Meister’s message. Similarly,
Ibn Al’Arabi’s own views on the matter have long been a subject of debate.
On the one hand, figures such as Mahmoud al-Ghorab see the Sheikh as a
true “Muslim and a traditionalist (salafi)”18—one who would never dare to
suggest that the soul may be as equally divine as its Creator, while others (such
as Mustafa Tahrali) forced to admit to the Fusus contain a large number of
“paradoxical expressions” concerning the relationship between God and
the soul.19
In both thinkers’ work the soul contains a mystery. For Eckhart “there is
in the soul something very secret and hidden and far above it”—this is the fa-
mous “spark of the soul” (vunklein or scintillae anima) which in some sermons
Eckhart says is created and in others uncreated.20 It is a fragment of the God-
head, bereft of attributes, images, and names, buried in the soul and consti-
tuting the only possibility for the soul to breakthrough to the Godhead—for,
in typical Scholastic fashion, union can only come through likeness, and the
soul possesses nothing else which is remotely like the Godhead.
Similarly in Ibn Al’Arabi the divine nature of the soul is also a secret
which we carry about inside us: “He prevented the real secret from being
known, namely that He is the essential Self of things. He conceals it by other-
ness, which is you.”21 As in Eckhart, the idea of an exclusively transcendent
God “out there” is an illusion, springing from a basic ignorance of one’s
own self. Hence the linking of self-knowledge with divine knowledge in Ibn
Al’Arabi (“Who knows his self, knows his Lord”), which leads one in turn to
the realization that God is both immanent and transcendent—in Tillich’s
18. See al-Ghorab, “Muhyiddin Ibn al-’Arabi among Traditions and Schools of
Thought,” in Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi: A Commemorative Volume, ed. Stephen Hirtenstein
and Michael Tiernan (Dorset: Element, 1993), p. 224.
19. See Mustafa Tahrali, “The Polarity of Expression in the Fusus al-Hikam,” in
Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi: A Commemorative Volume, ed. Stephen Hirtenstein and Michael
Tiernan (Dorset: Element, 1993), p. 358.
20. Clark, Meister Eckhart, p. 193: “neizwaz gar heimlˆıches und verborgens und
verre dar enhoben ist in der seˆle” (Predigt, pp. 7, 92).
21. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 133, p. 110.
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terms, both the ontological (Augustinian) and the cosmological (Thomist)
God.22 This sense of a common identity between creature and Creator in
Ibn Al’Arabi is so strong that it results in a series of increasingly daring state-
ments: “If we witness Him we witness ourselves, and when He sees us He
looks on Himself,” and “He worships me and I worship Him.”23
For Ibn Al’Arabi, the precedent for such declarations was not a happy
one. Al-Hallaj had famously pronounced “I am the Real” (anal Haqq) in
Baghdad in 922, and had been executed by the authorities as a result. As
one of the properties of God is to bestow Being upon things, the declara-
tion of the divinity of the soul in both Ibn Al’Arabi and Eckhart enables
both thinkers to make similar propositions—that we can hurt God, even
kill Him, that His being is in some way dependent on our recognition of
Him. In sermons such as Beati pauperes spiritu, Eckhart writes to this effect:
“And if I myself were not, God would not be either. That God is God, of
this I am a cause. If I were not, God would not be God.”24 Words which, as
John D. Caputo has pointed out, Hegel quoted approvingly in his Lectures
on the Philosophy of Religion; Caputo even goes so far as to suggest that
Eckhart started a tradition in German thought of ‘God-dependent-upon-
Man’ which, via Silesius and Hegel, was to reach Nietzsche and Marx.25
However, as most critics point out, the “God” Eckhart feels the soul can
hurt and even kill is the accessible, knowable “God” (Ibn Al’Arabi’s “God
of Belief”), and not the primordial divinity of the Godhead. In other words,
only our image of God is dependent upon our perception, not God Himself.
This is a common enough defense of Eckhart’s orthodoxy which, although
perfectly valid, is slightly undermined by occasional remarks to the con-
trary (In Mulier venit hora, for example: “God has such a need to seek us
out—exactly as if all his Godhead depended on it, as in fact it does.”).26
Eckhart’s inconsistent descriptions of the soul as sometimes created, some-
times uncreated (ungeschaffene) also complicates matters, particularly since
Eckhart denied having ever described the soul as uncreated during his
trial.
Why are we dwelling thus on the unorthodox possibilities in Eckhart’s
thought? Because, in a sense, their manifestation, alleged inconsistencies,
and proposed resolutions have their equivalents in Ibn Al’Arabi. Like
Eckhart, Ibn Al’Arabi presents a God who is in some way dependent upon
us. In discussing the etymology of the word ilah (divinity), Corbin suggests
22. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 92, p. 81.
23. Fusus al-Hikem, pp. 55, 95; pp. 53, 83.
24. Schu¨rmann, Meister Eckhart, p. 219: “und enwaere ich niht, soˆ enwaere ouch
<got> niht. Daz got <got> ist, des bin ich ein sache; enwaere ich niht, soˆ enwaere got
niht <got>” (Predigt, p. 52; Largier, p. 562).
25. John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought (Fordham Uni-
versity Press, 1978), p. 126.
26. Schu¨rmann, Meister Eckhart, p. 58.
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the root wlh, “connoting to be sad, to sigh toward, to flee fearfully toward.”27
This relates to a hadith or saying well known to Sufis: “I was a hidden trea-
sure and I yearned to be known. So I created creatures in order to be known
by them.” Ibn Al’Arabi’s most memorable expression of this is in the fifth
chapter on Ibrahim in the Fusus Al-Hikam:
Where then is His Self-sufficiency, Since I help Him and grant Him
Bliss? It is for this that the Real created me, For I give content to His
knowledge and manifest Him.28
This denial of self-sufficiency to God causes some problems, as earlier in the
Fusus Ibn Al’Arabi had isolated precisely this quality as “an incurable factor
of distinction” between God and the soul. God creates us, while “He is free of
all dependance whatsoever.”29 And so, on the one hand we have a “careful”
Ibn Al’Arabi, who cautiously attributes all the qualities of God to the soul
except for that of maintaining existence; and, on the other hand, a more
audacious version presents a soul that not only gives its Maker happiness and
Self-knowledge but also enables Him to exist. As with Eckhart, one could
remedy this by saying that the God of the first version is exclusively the Real
(al-haqq), while the God of the second version which the soul supports and
keeps in Being is merely the “God of belief.” However, parts of the Futuhat
seem to suggest that the soul genuinely could become one with the Real in
substantia and not simply in grace. In speaking of the spiritually advanced
who “have no station” (la maqam) Ibn Al’Arabi calls such believers “the divine
ones (al-ilahiyyun), since the Real is identical with them.”30 This seems to
move fairly close to Eckhart’s substantial linking of the Eternal Ground of
the Soul with the Ground in the Eternal Godhead.
One final point should be stressed: although we have repeatedly used
the word “become” in describing the soul becoming one with God, in both
Ibn Al’Arabi and Eckhart, God and the soul always already belong to the
same primordial source. A bond lies between them that precedes everything,
even creation. Eckhart writes: “In my birth, all things were born, and I was
the cause of my own self and and of all things.”31 When the soul flows out of
the Godhead and into the world, it acquires a name, a self, and a ‘God’. It
needs to “uncover the image of God” (gotes bilde in im entbloezende) buried in
itself, in order to remember where it came from.32 In other words, a latent
divinity in the soul has to be actualized. A.E. Affifi probably expresses this
27. Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ’Arabi, trans. Ralph
Manheim (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 112.
28. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 95, p. 83.
29. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 55.
30. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 376.
31. Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 208.
32. Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 150 (Predigt, p. 40; Largier, p. 430).
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idea best in relation to Ibn Al’Arabi:
when Ibnul’Arabi talks of mystical union with God he means a “state”
in which an already existing union is being realized or verified. The mystic
does not become God, for there is no becoming in Ibnul’Arabi’s theory, he
is essentially one with God in the sense everything else is.33
Given the fact that the central aim of Affifi’s study is to portray Ibn
Al’Arabi as a “thoroughgoing pantheist,” one could dismiss this surmise of
the Great Sheikh’s relation to God on the basis of everything else Affifi has
said. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to receive this impression from certain
parts of the Fusus—especially the tenth chapter on Hud, where otherness is
understood as an illusion, constructed by God, to hide the true nature of the
soul’s divinity from itself: “He prevented the real secret from being known,
namely that He is the essential Self of all things.”34 Whenever we say “you”
to God, we perpetuate this illusion of alterity, the mistaken conviction that
God is somehow other and separate from us. Hence, although Ibn Al’Arabi
does not quite express his idea of the soul in terms of a fragment of the
Godhead, spilling out of nameless unity into the world of the multiple, his
notion of the soul’s ‘secret’ (sirr) relationship with God, a common identity
anterior to the soul’s beliefs about itself, does appear to have a common
structure with Eckhart.
IV. CENTERLESSNESS AND WANDERING
Exactly how does the motif of wandering manifest itself in Eckhart’s ser-
mons? Furthermore, do they correspond to any of the ideas presented in
Ibn ‘Arabi’s various conjectures upon the Straight Path (al-sirat al-mustaqim)?
It is not difficult to imagine how Eckhart’s sermons—with their emphasis
on spiritual spontaneity, divine aimlessness, unconditional actions and the
ontological ‘opening’ and ‘emptying’ of oneself to God—can be considered
examples of a ‘wandering thought’. Sermons which have not only directly
inspired titles such as Reiner Schu¨rmann’s 1972 Maitre Eckhart ou la joie er-
rante, but also Angelus Silesius’s famous Cherubinic Wanderer, whose poem
“The Rose is without Why: it blooms because it blooms” is written in clear
homage to the Eckhartian tenet of the sunder warumbe, the “without-why.”35
The term pathless way (wec aˆne wec) is mentioned in Eckhart’s sermon Intravit
Iesus in quoddam castellum—the pathless way which “is free and yet fixed, in
which we are raised and exalted above ourselves and all things, with neither
will nor images”(vrˆı und doch gebunden, erhaben und gezucket vil nach u¨ber sich
33. A. E. Affifi, The Mystical Philosophy of Ibn Al’Arabi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1939), p. 140–41.
34. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 133.
35. For more on the link between Angelus Silesius and Eckhart, see Caputo,
Mystical Element, pp. 97–99.
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und alliu dinc aˆne willen und aˆne bilde).36 Eckhart’s phrase is deliberately
paradoxical, and in this, it reflects what Eckhart sees as both the necessity
of a spiritual direction and the danger that such a direction will be codified
and institutionalized into a doctrinal path. Can we arrive at where we want
to go without adhering to such paths? In such an adherence to the itinerary,
Eckhart seems to perceive a certain danger: “For whoever seeks God in
a special way gets the way and misses God” (Wan swer got suochet in wıˆse,
der nimet die wıˆse und laˆt got).37 Eckhart sees a path to God as potentially
becoming more important than God Himself. In following such a path, one
risks deifying it, idolizing it, transforming it into the object (and the end)
of one’s attentions.
Thus Eckhart’s pathless way is not an incitement to moral abandon or
self-indulgence, but an attempt to find a different, wayless way of breaking
through to the Godhead, free of images, concepts, and doctrines. The er-
rant, therefore, is not necessarily erroneous. One is tempted to ask: when
do people err (sinfully) in Eckhart, if such pathlessness is seen as spiritually
enhancing? Eckhart’s response to this, in one sermon, is to stress the need
for the soul to be free of all conceptions of God, self and external obliga-
tions. “Therefore the only reason why anyone has ever erred in anything
is that they have departed from this and have turned too much to exter-
nal things.”38 In order to breakthrough to the Godhead, the soul must be
as “free and untrammeled” as God is, which is where, as we will see, the
Eckhartian theme of detachment takes on a central role, distinguishing itself
from the attachment to a “special way.” In short: people only ever err, for
Eckhart, when they methodically follow a path.
Why does Eckhart urge us along his pathless way? Why is the ramble
superior to the journey, the uncertainty of the peregrinary preferable to the
destination of the pilgrimage? Eckhart’s suspicion of the pathbound and
the goal-orientated (a suspicion which translates “destination” as “motiva-
tion”) as ultimately constituting that which sterilizes and reifies faith, is one
response to this question. However, on a much more basic level, Eckhart’s
affirmation of errancy lies in conjunction with his desire to breakthrough
to the Godhead: to wander, in the Eckhartian sense, is to imitate God. This,
in turn, means that if God is a divine uncertainty, then we must become a
kind of uncertainty ourselves.
In order to understand this better, two points need to be made—first
of all, a standard motif in Christian thought is the desirability of the soul’s
likeness to God. The soul is born in a state of unlikeness—Augustine’s regio
dissimilitudinis —and must strive to resemble increasingly its Creator in order
36. Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 197 (taken from the sermon Intravit Iesus in quod-
dam castellum [Sermon 86 in Quint 3:486]).
37. M. O’C. Walshe, Meister Eckhart: German Sermons and Treatises (London:
Watkins, 1979). 1:117 (from In hoc apparuit caritas dei in nobis [Predigt, p. 5b, Largier,
p. 70]).
38. Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 217, from the sermon Ubi est qui natus est rex judae-
orum?
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to achieve union with it.39 Eckhart is in perfect accordance with this: “Our
masters say union presupposes likeness. Union cannot be without likeness”
(Daz sprechent unser meister: einunge wil haben glˆıchnisse. Einunge enmac niht
gesˆın, si enhabe glˆıchnisse).40 It is only through identity with God that Eckhart
can achieve the birth of God in the soul: “A master says: all likeness means
birth. He says further that like is not found in Nature unless it is born.”41
In order to undergo the mystical experience of engendering God in the
ground of the soul, the soul must become like God.
Secondly, the Eckhartian Godhead which the wandering soul imitates is
nameless, place-less, image-less. It has no origins and no destination. Just as
all the effects of the Godhead are unconditional and unmotivated, a simple
“overflowing”—God’s love essentially being “without why”—so must all our
actions and words be bereft of result-seeking motives and expectations. To
have no destination, to not care about one’s origins, is a step toward the
divine.
If the likeness of the soul to God is essential as a prerequisite to their
union, and if such a God is a divine no-thingness, aimlessly ebullient, we
can begin to understand why Eckhart sees errancy as anything but er-
ror. Schu¨rmann writes: “Identity is gained only this way; identity with God
is wandering.”42 The fact that the Eckhartian Godhead possesses no co-
ordinates, cannot be linked to a particular shrine or mountain top, rein-
forces Eckhart’s preference for the wanderer over the pilgrim:
A pagan master says: the nothingness of God fills all things while his
somethingness is nowhere. And so the soul cannot find God’s some-
thingness unless first she is reduced to nothingness wherever she may
be . . . Therefore a master says: whoever wishes to come to God should
take nothing with him.43
It is a passage which, in many ways, reminds one of Borges’s essay on the
non-location of the deity “The Fearful Sphere of Pascal”(“God is a fearful
sphere whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere”).44
If God’s “somethingness” is no-where, then whoever wishes to find this
“somethingness” must forget the pilgrimage, must abandon all their
itineraries, must rid themselves of any notion of where—for God lies “no-
where.” The passage cited could be redescribed as an urge to abandon the
ontotheological center we rely on to furnish our conceptions and images of
God, in virtue of a spiritual centerlessness, one which would let God be God.
39. From Confessions , Bk. 7, chap. 10.
40. Walshe, Meister Eckhart, p. 163, from the sermon Postquam completi erant dies
(Sermon 44 in Quint 2:338).
41. Walshe, Meister Eckhart, p. 164.
42. Schu¨rmann, Meister Eckhart, p. 47.
43. Davies, Meister Eckhart, p. 247.
44. Jorge Luis Borges, Labyrinths, trans. Donald A. Yates and Jane A. Isby
(London: Penguin, 1995), p. 227.
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How does this attitude toward wandering differ from that of Ibn
Al’Arabi? At first glance, it seems that the Great Sheikh is saying the exact
opposite. In accordance with the Koran’s various exhortations concerning
the One True Path, Ibn Al’Arabi appears to associate pathlessness with a
kind of ignorance, rather than any form of purer enlightenment:
Men may be divided into two groups. The first travel a way they know
and whose destination they know, which is their Straight Path. The sec-
ond group travel a way they do not know and of whose destination they
are unaware, which is equally the Straight Path. The Gnostic calls on
God with spiritual perception, while he who is not a Gnostic calls on
Him in ignorance and is bound by a tradition.45
Such ignorance of the true path is qualified, as ever in Ibn Al’Arabi, by the
omnipresence of God. The author of the Fusus never tires of quoting
the verse Wheresoever you turn, there is the face of God (2:115)—a verse which
helps us understand exactly why Ibn Al’Arabi is tolerant toward a multiplic-
ity of paths.46 If God truly is the “essential Reality” of all things, then no path
is crooked, for every path ultimately leads one back to God (“Certainly, all
roads lead to Allah, since He is the end of every road”).47 If, for Eckhart,
the pilgrimage is an illusion because God’s center is nowhere, wandering is
redeemed for Ibn Al’Arabi because God is everywhere. If God is omnipresent
in all things, then errancy can never truly be error.
All of which, however, still does not mean that Ibn Al’Arabi shares
Eckhart’s advocating of the pathless. All paths lead to God, though not all
paths lead to felicity. Only the road which follows the Law (al-mashru’a) can
accomplish this—what is important, however, is not to forget the correct
attitude we should maintain while walking such a path. In praying numaz,
for example, we should still continue to pray toward Mecca:
However, do not tell yourself that He is in that direction only, but
rather maintain both your attitude in facing the sacred mosque and
your attitude to the impossibility of confining His face to that partic-
ular direction, it being merely one of many points toward which men
turn.48
There is a wariness here toward directions and destinations which does seem
to share a common spirit with Eckhart. The mistaken belief that Allah lies
only in the direction of Mecca can threaten to blind the Gnostic to the true
infinity of God, just as the Eckhartian believer who adheres too closely to
a particular way “gets the way and misses God”—even if, for Ibn Al’Arabi,
45. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 132, p. 105.
46. Cited in Fusus al-Hikem, p. 137, p. 113.
47. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 303.
48. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 138, p. 114.
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overt devotion toward a particular path doesn’t cause the believer to “miss”
God, but simply to “restrict” Him. For the Great Sheikh the problem is not
so much the path, but rather our attitude toward it.
In relation to the motifs of centerlessness and wandering in the two
masters, two final points need to be made concerning similarity (tashabbuh)
and bewilderment (hayra). Like Eckhart, Ibn Al’Arabi places great emphasis
on the need for the soul to become “similar” to God—however, what the
Sufi understands by the term tashabbuh is quite different from Eckhart’s
idea of similarity. As we saw, Eckhart’s aim for the soul is to be as “free and
empty” (ledic und vri) as God is—as free of names, images, and directions as
the Godhead. Ibn Al’Arabi, however, generally uses the term “similar” as a
synonym for his own exhortation to “assume the traits of the divine names”
(al-takhalluq bi’l-asma’ al-ilahiyya). As the soul already possesses all of the
Divine Names of Allah in potentia—Patience, Love, Mercy, and the like—the
duty of the soul is to become similar to God by actualizing these latent
qualities in itself. In other words, for Eckhart “similarity to God” means to
get rid of names and attributes, whereas in Ibn Al’Arabi it means to acquire
them.
It should also be remembered that, for Ibn Al’Arabi, all paths ultimately
end in bewilderment (hayra). This is the bewilderment of one who is finally
immersed in the infinity of God and engulfed by the all-encompassing per-
plexity of the Divine—a state best described by the author of the Fusus in
his chapter on Moses:
[True] guidance means being guided to bewilderment, that he might
know that the whole affair [of God] is perplexity, which means pertur-
bation and flux, and flux is life.49
If God is perplexity—and all roads lead to God—then the ultimate destina-
tion of all paths is a “non-destination.” In short, one embarks upon a path
in Ibn Al’Arabi not to find oneself, but to lose oneself. Ibn Al’Arabi calls this
“drowned in the seas of the knowledge of God.”50 Thus the path is actually
a temporary means to a permanent pathlessness. Nowhere, however, does
Ibn Al’Arabi advocate a centerless wandering as a means of obtaining union
with the divine.
V. INFINITE HERMENEUTICS: SEAS WITHOUT SHORES
In the otherwise thoughtful and informative introduction to his translation
of Ibn Al’Arabi’s Shajarat al-Kawn, A. Jeffrey writes how
49. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 254, p. 200.
50. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 79.
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[Ibn Al’Arabi’s] curious exegetic methods in interpreting passages from
the Quran . . . are not sufficiently different from similar arbitrary exe-
gesis of the Bible in Jewish and Christian circles . . . to merit special
comment.51
First of all, neither Ibn Al’Arabi nor the “Jewish and Christian” exegetes
Jeffrey refers to would ever have described their labors as “arbitrary”; every
nuance, etymology, and symbol gleaned from the sacred text had a very clear
purpose and meaning for the medieval reader, however far-fetched and “ar-
bitrary” such interpretations might seem to the modern eye. Secondly, the
fact that both Eckhart and Ibn Al’Arabi, amongst many others, believed in
an infinitely readable Text does not mean they are “not justifiably different
. . . to merit special comment.” Declaring a text to possess an infinite number
of meanings is one thing—the various reasons why one believes this to be the
case is quite another. The point I want to make in this final section lies pre-
cisely in the different reasons why both masters believe in the endless texts of
their respective holy scriptures. Eckhart and Ibn Al’Arabi’s positions on the
(un)knowability of God and their different understandings of His ineffabil-
ity, I hope to show, are perfectly replicated in their respective hermeneutics.
For both masters, the semantic inexhaustibility of the divine text is simply
an extension of what they have already said about the Divinity itself.
In writing about the infinite hermeneutics of Ibn Al’Arabi, it becomes
difficult to avoid mentioning a rather sharp disagreement amongst criti-
cal scholarship as to exactly how flexible Ibn Al’Arabi’s hermeneutics ac-
tually are. The disagreement centers over the use of a certain term, ta’wil,
which literally means “carrying back to” but which generally refers to a
rather mystical and esoteric technique of exegesis, more often than not
associated with Shi’i Islam. The practice of ta’wil encourages the idea of
a text with an infinite number of inner meanings (batin)—rather than in-
terpreting the text, the ta’wil releases it, leading the reader onto a whole
new level of higher meanings. The main proponent of such a version of
Ibn Al’Arabi has been Henry Corbin. As Corbin spent many years teach-
ing in Iran, most critics tend to see Corbin’s linking of Ibn Al’Arabi with
ta’wil as part of his general desire to present the Great Sheikh as “a pure
Shi’ite.”52 Chittick, most notably, opposes this idea with the observation
that most of Ibn Al’Arabi’s references to ta’wil in the Futuhat are actually
explicitly negative. Of course, Chittick’s knowledge of his subject and the
quality of his scholarship are beyond question; however, in his opposition to
Corbin, Chittick feels compelled to make some slightly incredible claims for
the orthodoxy of Ibn Al’Arabi’s hermeneutics—in particular, that he “dis-
plays a tremendous reverence for the literal text.”53 Any reader of the Fusus
Al-Hikam, with its mystical numerologies, strange etymologies, obscure
51. A. Jeffrey, trans., Shajarat al-Kawn (Lahore: Aziz, 1980), p. 25.
52. Corbin, Creative Imagination, p. 26.
53. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. xvi.
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interpretations, implicit criticism of Noah, and apparent praise for the tyran-
nical Pharaoh, may be forgiven for thinking otherwise.
One of the first differences that strikes one between the hermeneutics
of Ibn Al’Arabi and Meister Eckhart is that Eckhart, unlike his Sufi coun-
terpart, actually says relatively little about the act of interpretation itself.
Whereas long sections of the Futuhat are given over to a self-conscious and
rigorous examination of all the problems of interpretation and their various
implications, Eckhart seldom analyses the activity of exegesis—most of his
thoughts on this subject presented in the German works are restricted to two
or three sermons. What does unite the two thinkers, however, is a common
tendency to reinscribe popular phrases and stories from the Koran and the
Bible into their own thought-systems by imposing radically different inter-
pretations upon them. Thus, Eckhart will interpret Jesus’ casting out of the
money-lenders as the need to clear (empty) the temple (ground of the soul)
of all unwanted inhabitants (concepts, names, images) before Christ can en-
ter it (the divine birth of the logos in the ground of the soul). In a similar
way, Ibn Al’Arabi will reinterpret an apparently straightforward verse such
as Fear your Lord (4:1) as meaning “Make your outer selves a protection for
your Lord, and make your inner [reality], which is your Lord, a protection
for your outer selves.”54
We have already seen how Eckhart’s version of the Godhead forever
recedes before whatever proposition we try to make about it. “If you visu-
alize anything or if anything enters your mind, that is not God. Indeed,
he is neither this nor that.”55 God remains radically Other to whatever we
try to say, sing, murmur, or paint about Him. An apophatic theology which,
interestingly enough, Eckhart reinforces with reference to a venerated “hea-
then master,” the eleventh century Islamic philosopher Avicenna (Ibn Sina):
“God is a Being to whom nothing is, or can be, similar.”56 This idea of a God
about Whom our assertions are forever incomplete is reflected in Eckhart’s
hermeneutics, where he suggests that the biblical text may well have a pro-
gressively infinite number of meanings:
there is none so wise that when he tries to fathom it, he will not find it
deeper yet and discover more in it. Whatever we may hear, and whatever
anyone can tell us, contains another hidden sense.57
54. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 57, p. 56. One cannot help but think of Heidegger here,
who can take a fragment from the Pre-Socratics such as Anaximander’s “Here, too,
the gods come to presence” (einai gar kai entautha theos) and reinterpret it to mean
a much more Heideggerian “The familiar abode for man is the open region for the
presencing of god.” See Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings: Martin
Heidegger, ed. David Krell (London: Routledge, 1978), p. 258.
55. Schu¨rmann, Meister Eckhart, p. 125.
56. Clark, Meister Eckhart, p. 179 (taken from Avicenna’s Metaphysicae, Lib. ix,
chap. 1).
57. “vnnd es ist auch niemant so weyss, der sy gru¨nden woll, er fynde sy tieffer vnnd fynde
mer darinn. Alles, das wir hie horen mogen, vnnd alles, das man vns gesagen mag, das hat
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The analogy for the scriptures that Eckhart moves close to here—that of
a bottomless, unfathomable ocean—has its precedents in both Islamic and
Christian traditions (most notably in Origen and Al-Ghazali).58 What is dis-
tinctive about Eckhart’s passage is the faint sense of futility with which he
imbues the interpretive act. Unlocked secrets only ever lead to more secrets,
which lead to more, ad infinitum. Or, in Sufi terms, the comprehension of
the zahir yields no batin, but simply an endless succession of more zahir,
without any hope of ever “touching the bottom.” No small wonder, then,
that Eckhart described the Godhead as an “abyss,” that which is literally
without end (ab-grunt). Like the Godhead, the Holy Scriptures are one such
abyss—a book whose meanings have no conceivable end.
The spirit of Ibn Al’Arabi’s hermeneutics has the same mood of lim-
itlessness about it, if for radically different reasons. Like Eckhart, Ibn
Al’Arabi’s hermeneutics cannot be separated from his theology. We have
seen how the “essential Reality of God lies in all things,” and consequently
how the omnipresence of God lies in all directions. Ibn Al’Arabi’s hermeneu-
tics translate this divine omnipresence into purely textual terms—if the Re-
ality of God lies in all things, and if the center of God lies in all directions,
then the intention of God lies in all interpretations:
We say concerning the senses of a verse that all are intended by God.
No one forces anything upon God . . . The reason for this is as follows:
The verse of God’s speech, of whatever sort it might be—Koran, revealed
book, scripture, divine report—is a sign or a remark signifying what the
words (lafz) support in all senses and intended by the One who sent
down His speech in those words . . . . For He who sent it down knows
all those senses without exception. He knows that His servants are dis-
parate in their consideration of those words . . . . Hence, when someone
understands a sense from the verse, that sense is intended by God in
this verse in the case of the person who finds it.59
Just as Ibn Al’Arabi allows for the validity of an individual’s finitizing
conception of God, in a similar way he is equally tolerant of our finite
understandings of the infinite text. Our single perspective confines us to
alles eynen anderen, verborgenen synn darinn” (M. O’C. Walshe, Meister Eckhart:German
Sermons and Treatises [London: Watkins, 1979], 2:250; Sermon 51 in Quint 2:467).
58. In his Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, Eco reels off an impressive series of
instances in medieval thought where the scriptures were portrayed as a source of
endless meaning. St. Jerome considered the scriptures to be an “infinite forest of
meaning,” Origen referred to them in his In Genesin Homiliae as “a mysterious ocean
of the divinity,” while Gilbert of Stanford thought of the Bible as a fast flowing river,
which constantly produced new meanings. See Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas
Aquinas, trans. Hugh Bredin (London: Radius, 1988), p. 145. An examination of Al-
Ghazali’s reference to the Koran as a “sea without a shore” can be found in Gerald
Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993),
pp. 124–37.
59. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 244.
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a single understanding, whereas the Divine Author has comprehended all
possible senses. Therefore, as in Eckhart, our interpretation of the text is
forever incomplete, but for different reasons. In Eckhart, the real meaning
of the text is never reached; its promise always recedes from the interpreter
into infinite possibility, forever eluding the actualizing gaze of the exegete
just as the radical alterity of the Godhead eludes all of our expressions. The
interpreter of the Bible is forever undermined by the existence of another
“deeper” and “hidden” sense.
This undermining or belittling of the finite interpretation simply does
not take place in Ibn Al’Arabi. There are no perpetually “deeper” senses,
but simply an infinite range of alternative ones. The “shoreless ocean” of the
Koran comprises all things—as the Koran itself says, We have missed nothing
out (6:38). In Ibn Al’Arabi’s word, it is the book which, “to the exclusion of all
other books, alone possesses all-comprehensiveness (jami’yya).”60 An inter-
pretation is one aspect of this immense infinity, one which retains its relative
validity and is never diminished or flawed by some perpetually “other” sense.
VI. PROVISIONARY CONCLUSIONS
These brief and somewhat cursory remarks constitute only the beginning
of a comparative study of the two thinkers. Not only do they remain unde-
veloped, but many more possible similarities have not even been touched
upon—the concept of self-annihilation (fana, niht-werdenne) and union with
the divine (ittisal, einunge) in both thinkers, the ‘continuous’ idea of cre-
ation that plays a central role both in Eckhart (the continuous birth of the
Son in the Ground of the Soul) and Ibn Al’Arabi (the renewal of creation
in each instant), notions of preparedness (istidad, bereitschaft) and openness
(futuh, offenung), not to mention the various stylistic metaphors and
analogies which both writers frequently make use of (water/cup, mir-
ror/reflection, kernel/shell, clothing/nakedness, and so on). Equally
importantly, some significant differences between the two figures have not
been articulated. The various stations and waystations (maqam, manzil) of
the spiritual path, for example, which Ibn Al’Arabi copiously annotates and
painstakingly elaborates upon in the Futuhat, never really enjoys the same
amount of attention in Eckhart. Apart from the brief descriptions of the
soul’s journey at the beginning of On the Nobleman, the word ‘stage’ (graˆt)
occupies no central role in the Dominican’s thought, the metaphor of the
“breakthrough” (Durchbruch) supplying the dominant image for Eckhart’s
idea of divine knowledge.
Another important difference which would merit further investigation
is the distinctive (and doubtless provocative) way in which Eckhart describes
60. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 239.
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the Godhead as a “darkness” (vinsternisse), a “nothingness” (niht), a “desert”
(wuste) and an “abyss” (abgrunt), substantives which the Sufi never really
attributes to God. For Ibn Al’Arabi, “God is sheer light [nur], while the im-
possible is sheer darkness [zulma],”61 even though in some places he does de-
scribe the names of incompatibility (tanzih) as a collection of “darknesses.”62
Ibn ‘Arabi never really calls God a “desert,” although in his “Book of Majesty
and Beauty” (Kitap al-jalal wa-l Jamal) he does say how “there is no relation-
ship [between the temporal and the eternal] in the deserts of bewilderment
of this majesty.”63 Nor does Ibn ‘Arabi really stress the idea of God as a
darkness, although Izutsu dedicates a central chapter of his famous study to
the “Abysmal Darkness” in Ibn ‘Arabi, although the word he uses—‘ama’—is
more often employed by the Sheikh’s disciple, al-Qunaishi.64 The closest Ibn
Al’Arabi comes to calling God a kind of nothingness is the tradition “God
is, and nothing [la shay] is with Him,” although this is more an account of
how entities cannot persist in their being once they reach the presence of
the Real, rather than any description of the Real itself.65 And finally, even
though Ibn Al’Arabi never explicitly calls God “an abyss,” he does use in the
Fusus the word hawa for divine passion. A word whose Arabic root, as Austin
points out, contains the meanings “to fall headlong,” “to be wide and deep,”
and “abyss.”66
Three points, for now, can be drawn from a comparison of the vernac-
ular writings of Meister Eckhart with the Fusus al-Hikam and Futuhat of Ibn
Al’Arabi. First of all, although both writers constantly emphasize the One-
ness of God, their idea of the relationship between this Oneness and the mul-
tiple is fundamentally different. Whereas Ibn Al’Arabi perceives the pres-
ence of God in all things—and understands this presence as a completely
valid opportunity to glimpse the whole through the fragments—Eckhart’s
world is only of use insofar as it can tell the soul not what God is, but only what
He is not. In Ibn Al’Arabi God permeates the world of phenomena, whereas
in Eckhart the world simply reflects, in a negative, apophatic way, the radical
otherness of God. Secondly, both thinkers make an identical distinction be-
tween a God we construct—a God we can talk about—and an unspeakable,
attribute-less ‘God’ prior to this divinity. However, whereas Eckhart insists
we have to abandon this construct if we are truly to acquire divine knowl-
edge, his Sufi counterpart only sees the “God-as-construct” as an obstacle
if we fail to realize there is “Someone” beyond it which supersedes our un-
derstanding. Once we realize the “actual situation,” then our worship of the
61. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 214.
62. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 58.
63. Rabia Terri Harris, trans. “Book of Majesty and Beauty,” Journal of the
Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi Society 8 (1989): 25.
64. See T. Izutsu, A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical Concepts in Taoism
and Sufism, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Keio University, 1967).
65. Chittick, Sufi Path, p. 364.
66. Fusus al-Hikem, p. 242.
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God we construct is no longer idolatrous. Thirdly, the belief that a secret,
latent part of the soul actually enjoys a privileged and anterior relationship
with the Real/Godhead, a relationship ranging in various instances from the
analogous to the substantial, offers the most convincing point of similarity
between the two vocabularies. Particularly since all the implications arising
from such a tenet—that God is vulnerable, dependent upon us, that we in
turn can kill God, hurt Him, deprive Him of His Being—are considered and
developed by both authors.
The spirit of these distinctions seem to suggest the following: if Ibn
Al’Arabi’s God is known by all names, then Eckhart’s God is known by no
name. If Ibn Al’Arabi’s God lies in all directions, then Eckhart’s God can
be found in none of them. The consistent Sufi emphasis on “the essential
Reality [lying ] in all things”—a belief I refrain from labeling “pantheism”—
forces apart two otherwise compatible critiques of metaphysical thought
and rational consideration, gently pushing them in opposite directions.
Even in less centrally-located areas of their thought such as pilgrimage and
hermeneutics, this can be discerned. The omnipresence of Ibn Al’Arabi’s
God renders all (justifiable) interpretations acceptable, and all directions as
God-filled as Mecca’s. Whereas Eckhart’s scriptures will forever hide some-
thing elusively Other from the exegete—whereas Eckhart’s wanderer will
see all his destinations as ultimately rendered irrelevant by the non-location
of the Godhead—the Sufi master seems to be suggesting, through similar
terminology and from an identical point of departure, a significantly differ-
ent direction.
